History of Contract Law

History of Contract Law Contract Law In Brief – History of Contract Law The development of contract law into its modern conception is fundamentally based on the Latin principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ (‘all pacts must be kept’) dating back to when trade first began in earnest. Therefore, with this in mind, as the law has developed, breach of contract has come to be recognised by the common law legal system. As a result, it is to be appreciated that remedies can then be effectively provided as a consequence for all manner of agreements that are reached by parties at various levels from individuals to corporations to countries themselves leading to the establishment of obligations between the said parties entered into freely with the aim to create legal relations. This is because of the fact that clearly, in view of the nature of the relationships that are formed, it is important to look to take steps to effectively guarantee equality in these relationships so that the party that is seen to be in the most superior position cannot simply ride ‘roughshod’ over the consumer simply because it suits them. As a consequence, the common law and the legislation that has since been developed through the years in this area has served to establish where a contract has been effectively and legally formed and as to how and when it can be reached and the remedies that are said to be available in such circumstances for the party that is injured by the breakdown in the relationship. Therefore, with this in mind, it is generally believed that the system is effective but, with ongoing technological advancements, only will tell how long it will take before the law is changed in recognition of this. In the development of the concept and principles of the law of contract in this country the courts, in relation to various aspects of the topic, have reached many significant decisions. By way of illustration, one of the most famous cases in the whole of the law of contract must be the seminal decision in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256, in relation to the distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat, that must be closely followed by the decision in Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 1 B Ald. 681, that served to establish the ‘postal rule’ that has since been somewhat adapted, through technological advancements, so as to also be read in accordance with Entores v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327. Moreover, the issue of mistake, as a reason for considering a contract to be void, was effectively illustrated by Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161, HL, that was also supported by the decision in Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, HL, in r elation to the concept of misrepresentation. Finally, in relation to consumer protection, the decision in Saphena Computing v. Allied Collection Agencies [1995] FSR 616 is reflective of the need for quality in the goods that are offered by way of contract so that there are standards to be adhered to that can be redressed. In looking to consider whether a valid contract has been formed it is generally considered to be a good idea to look at the negotiations that have taken place between the parties. But this can be quite problematic where there there is a lengthy course of negotiations between the parties because it may be difficult to effectively determine when they have actually reached an agreement, supported by Kennedy v. Lee (1817) 3 Mer 441. Nevertheless, inspite of a prolonged period of continuing negotiations, the courts may be willing to find a concluded bargain; and, if so, a continuance of the negotiations thereafter will not necessarily terminate that agreement, illustrated by Davies v. Sweet [1962] 2 QB 300. However, in making their decision in relation to any series of negotiations put before them, the courts will also look to consider the three fundamental aspects that are recognised as part of any contract – (a) offer; (b) consideration; and (c) acceptance – in order to make their decision about whether an agreement has been fromed leading to a binding contract. (a) Offer The offer is considered to be concerned with the making of a written or oral proposal to give or do something as part of an agreement that may be deemed to be a legally binding contract in certain circumstances that may be express or implied from the conduct of the parties in any given case. As a consequence, it is important to understand that the person making the offer is the offeror, whilst the person to whom the offer is made is the offeree and any given offer must adhere to the following rules – (i) it must be made to a definite person, class or person, or even the world at large; (ii) it must be effectively communicated to the offeree before acceptance; but (iii) the offer is only considered to have been made when it actually reaches the offeree – see, by way of illustration, the decision in Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 1 B Ald. 681. (b) Consideration The element of consideration within a contract refers to that which is actually given or accepted in return for a promise as part of an agreement in the form of a â€Å"right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other†, in keeping with the decision in Currie v. Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153. Consideration is executed when the act that is considered to constitute the consideration in a given case is performed and is deemed to be ‘executory’ when it is yet to be performed in the future. But regardless of this, any element of consideration must be legal, not be past, and move from the promisee to the promisor, supported by Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 WLR 10. (c) Acceptance The idea of acceptance relates to the idea of where an offer is made by one party that is considered to be acceptable to another without qualification in words or through conduct to the offeror in conformation with the indicated or prescribe terms of the offer that has been made, in keeping with the decision in Hyde v. Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334. But it also must be recognised that it is possible to have an acceptance ‘subject to contract’ where the parties will only be bound where a formal contract is prepared and then signed, according to Chillingworth v. Esche [1924] 1 Ch 97. Moreover, the acceptance of goods within the remit of section 2 of the Sale Supply of Goods Act 1994 takes place when the buyer indicates to the seller that they have accepted them or, when they have been delivered, acts in a way that is considered to be inconsistent with the sellers ownership or retains them for a substantial period without rejecting them. (a) Counter Offer A counter offer is usually taken to refer to the occasions where the offeree makes a response that serves to effectively suggest that there is only likely to be an agreement on terms that are considered to be substantially different from those that were originally put forward. Therefore, with this in mind, this idea is perhaps best illustrated by way of a practical example – i.e. where Party A says to Party B â€Å"You can have my horse for  £10,000† and Party B thinks about this and then says â€Å"I like this horse, but I am only willing to go to  £8,000† that is effectively a counter offer that is also supported by the decision in Butler Machine Tool Co v. Ex-Cell-O Corp [1979] 1 WLR 401. (b) Invitation to Treat The idea of an invitation to treat is effectively based on the premise of an offer to receive an offer and whilst this principle of the law of contract was considered to have most famously been considered in the decision in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256, it is important to appreciate that, in Fisher v. Bell [1961] 1 QB 394, Lord Parker most effectively served to summarise the concept. This is because of the fact that, in this case, he said that, by way of illustration, â€Å"the display of an article with a price on it in the shop window is merely an invitation to treat. It is in no sense an offer for sale, the acceptance of which constitutes a contract†. (c) The ‘Postal Rule’ As an important aspect of contractual theory, the ‘postal rule’ was an early nineteenth-century common law doctrinal development. Therefore, it served to hols an epistolary acceptance of a contractual offer will be said to become binding when it is put within the course of the postal service, according to Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 1 B Ald. 681, as the fairest method of allocating the risk, supported by Household Fire Insurance Co. v. Grant (1879) 4 Ex. D 216, and to avoid the revocation of the offer that was made leading to the acceptance until it was received, illustrated by the decision in Re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587. Consequently, it is to be appreciated that a complete contractual agreement was said to exist when the properly stamped and addressed ‘letter’ is put in the course of postal transmission, supported by Henthorn v. Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27, and beyond the power of the acceptor so it is immaterial whether it reaches the offeror or not, illustrated by Brogden v. Directors of the Metropolitan Railway Company (1877) 2 App. Las 666. Consequently, the ‘Postal Rule’ is usually considered to be somewhat advantageous for the offeree since they will not be responsible for delay because the burden of uncertainty of waiting is with the offeror. Whilst the Internet does not require a direct physical link between the users, it does allow the user to be notified if a message is successfully sent and/or received by another machine. But, whilst it is imperative for the user to re-send their message where it has not been successfully sent or received, in keeping with the decision in Entores v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327, intention to formulate e-contracts effectively is still open to debate, illustrated by Pretty Pictures Sarl v. Quixote Films Ltd (2003) All ER (D) 303. Such a view has arisen because the contract in such cases comes into existence where acceptance is received, supported by Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl Stahl warenhandelgesellschaftmbh (1982) 1 All ER 293. Therefore, generally, for revocation of acceptance of an offer to be effective in this area, revocation would take effect when it is communicated if they were considered to be revoking the ‘offer’ to take the goods, illustrated by Byrne v. Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 349. But this is not the case with ‘electronic contracts’ formed under the ‘postal rule’, so anyone contracting on this basis would need to be advised the acceptance of an offer is complete as soon as the acceptance is ‘posted’. However, there is some controversy in this area because such a revocation would usually in no way have prejudiced the offeror if they were to receive the revocation before the acceptance and the only direct authority is that of the troubling decision in Countess of Dunmore v. Alexander (1830) 9 S. 190 so the better view is that such acceptance is generally irrevocable, in keeping with Wenkheim v. Arndt (1873) 1 JR 73 (NZ). But statutory provisions have provided for a ‘cooling off’ period since the Consumer Credit Act 1974 with one of the most recent examples found in the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000. Therefore, on the basis of the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000, it is possible to cancel an order because the effective date of cancellation is when the cancellation is sent, but this is usually after acceptance has been received, making it difficult to resolve on the basis of how their contract was formed. The concept of ‘quasi-contracts’ generally arises in cases where the law imposes on someone an obligation, through the creation of another contractual arrangement, to make repayments on grounds of unjust benefit at the expense of someone else, in keeping with the decision in Shamia v. Joory [1958] 1 QB 448. Therefore, with this in mind, more specifically, in the case of building and construction contracts in particular, situations may arise where the party that is paying for the work may draft the contract to derive ‘money benefits’, illustrated by Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley [2002] 2 WLR 802 and, on analogy, Westdeutche Landesbank v. Islington LBC [1996] 2 All ER 961, HL and may be considered voidable if they entered into it under duress or undue influence, supported by Barton v. Armstrong [1975] 2 All ER 465, PC. But if the contract is voluntarily acted upon, it must also be recognised that it will usually be considered to be binding, in keeping with the dec ision in Ormes v. Beadel (1860) 2 De GF J 333, unless it is voidable on grounds of restituion. Letter of Intent In the past, it has been argued a letter of intent could be considered to be akin to conditional contract, illustrated by British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Engineering Co [1984] 1 All ER 504. But the success in this particular case can also be contrasted with the decision in Regalian Properties Plc v. London Dockland Development Corporation [1995] 1 WLR 212 where there was an unsccessful action for reimbursement of expenses incurred by a property developer regarding preparatory work in respect of a contract that also never materialised. Such a differing view is largely based on the fact that these cases are not analogous because, whilst one party, in British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Engineering Co [1984] 1 All ER 504, requested the other to perform services and supply goods that would have been required under the expected contract, the costs that Regalian Properties Plc v. London Dockland Development Corporation [1995] 1 WLR 212 sought reimbursements for arose in an effort to put itself in a position to obtain and then actually perform the contract itself A breach of contract generally arises where there is a recognised failure or refusal by one of the parties to a contractual agreement to fulfil one of the obligations that have been imposed on them under the remit of that contract. Therefore, with this in mind, in such circumstances the contract will be discharged where the breach of contract in question has been found to lead to the innocent party to the agreement treating it as having been rescinded and also, where it has been found to have the effect of depriving one of the parties of the whole benefit of the agreement with undertakings still to be performed, supported by the decisions in Hong Kong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 QB 26 and Photo Productions Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827. The concept of mistake in the context of contract law serves to negative, or to nullify, consent by preventing the parties involved from reaching agreement and nullifying consent where the parties reach agreement, according to Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161, HL. But it is also important to appreciate equitable remedies do not serve to distinguish between mistakes negativing, and nullifying, consent, as well as where a party who paid money seeks to recover it in restitution, illustrated by Kelly v. Solari (1841) 9 M W 54. However, mistake will not negative consent unless it is material to the agreement’s formation, according to Dennant v. Skinner Collom [1948] 2 KB 164. This is because, without the assent of both parties, in most cases each party will look as though they are assenting to the proposed terms; so the objective test will preclude any party from denying an agreement, supported by OT Africa Line Ltd v. Vickers plc [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 700. Nevertheless, if one party is, to the knowledge of the other in a given case, mistaken as to the terms, evidence of subjective intention is admitted, according to LCC v. Henry Boot Sons Ltd [1959] 3 All ER 636, HL, so there will be no agreement in the objective sense and may be even no agreement at all, illustrated by Belle River Community Arena Inc v. WJC Kaufmann Co Ltd (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 761. However, it is also to be appreciated that there seems to be no reason why there should not be a subjective agreement where the other party is estopped, according to Alternative Publishing Ltd v. Kingstar Manufacturing (UK) Ltd [1996] CLY 1223, CA, and equitable remedies have been granted, supported by A Roberts Co Ltd v. Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555. The concept of misrepresentation refers to the situation where a false statement of fact is made and is considered to be fraudulent if is is made either recklessly or with the intent to deceive, in keeping with the decision in Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, HL, so anyone induced to enter a contract may then rescind the contract, claim damages or even both, according to S Pearson Son Ltd v. Dublin Corpn [1907] AC 351, HL. Moreover, it is also to be appreciated that a contractor induced to enter a contract by reason of an innocent misrepresentation may also rescind the contract or claim damages. Nevertheless, whilst the court has discretion to award damages in lieu of rescission, under section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, the measure of damages payable is generally the sum of money that placed the representee in the position they would have been in if the representation had not been made, supported by Gran Gelato Ltd v. Richcliff (Group) Ltd [1992] Ch 560. However, it must be recognised that a contractor who continues to act upon a contract after discovering a statement was false loses their right to rescind, accoridng to Long v. Lloyd [1958] 2 All ER 402, CA, so they will only be entitled to the price agreed under that contract, supported by Glasgow South Western Rly Co v. Boyd Forrest [1915] AC 526, HL. (c) Frustration It is also to be appreciated, however, that the doctrine of frustration has evolved so as to serve to mitigate the rigour of the common law’s insistence on literal performance of absolute promises, in keeping with the decision in J Lauritzen AS v. Wijsmuller BV, The Super Servant Two [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, so as to be able to give effect to the demands of justice to escape from injustice where it would result from enforcement of a contract. Moreover, the concept of frustration also effectively ‘kills’ the contract and discharges the parties to any agreement from further liability under it, so the doctrine cannot be lightly invoked but must be kept within very narrow limits, since it brings the contract to an end forthwith, without more and automatically. Therefore, with this in mind, it must be recognised that the essence of frustration should not be the act or election of the party seeking to rely upon it, but due to some outside event or extraneous chang e of situation, without blame or fault on the side of the party seeking to rely upon it, supported by Kissavos Shipping Co SA v. Empressa Cubana de Fletes, The Agathon [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 211. (d) Restitution It is also to be appreciated that, generally, where someone is found to have gained unjustly from another’s conduct, those gains should be returned as a result of, what may be considered apt in this context, for example, a breach of contract. Accordingly, by way of illustration, in the decision of Attorney-General v. Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, the defendant in this case had made a sizable profit from the act of breaching his contract with the claimant who was undoubtedly entitled to claim compensatory damages but had suffered little or no identifiable loss. Therefore, with this in mind, the claimant sought restitution for breach of contract and the defendant was ordered to pay over his profits although restitution is still only available in exceptional circumstances. Wrongful Termination Nevertheless, it is also to be appreciated that a wrongful termination does not ipso facto serve to amount to a repudiation of the contract, in keeping with the decision in ER Dyer Ltd v. Simon Build/Peter Lind Partnership (1982) 23 BLR 23. But then it must also be recognised that if the employer ousts the contractor from the site or otherwise shows an intention not to be bound by the contract, the contractor may claim the value of the work done and damages. Such a view has arisen on the basis of any instalment payments, supported by Bank of Boston Connecticut v. European Grain Shipping Ltd [1989] AC 1056, HL, together with payment at contractual rates or prices for work not already included, illustrated by the decision in Felton v. Wharrin (1906) 2 Hudson’s BC (4th Edn) 398, CA. Moreover, a reasonable sum will be assessed and payable as a contractual entitlement, with an abatement of the sum otherwise due if the work done is defective, according to Slater v. CA Duquemin Ltd (1992) 29 Con LR 24. Moreover, such an action may also lead to a claim for specific performance of the contract where it should not have been terminated, in keeping with the decision in Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58, HL. As has already been alluded to, there are other kinds of contract outside of the business to consumer, or business to business, agreement that must be recognised. Therefore, with this in mind, it is to be appreciated that within these other concepts of contract, it must be recognised that construction contracts have certain principles that may be considered to very specific to this kind of contract aside from the general principles identifeid for all contracts. (a) Sub-contractors Quantum Meruit By sub-letting part of the work, it is important to appreciate that, within the context of a construction contract, the main contractor impliedly contracts with the sub-contractor that they will not prevent the sub-contractor from doing their work otherwise they will have a claim for damages against them, in keeping with the decision in British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Engineering Co [1984] 1 All ER 504, under the principle of ‘Quantum Meruit’. However, it is also to be appreicated that the sub-contractor is also liable to the main contractor for defective work, as the relationship between them is similar to that of employer and contractor, supported by Aurum Investments Ltd v. Avonforce Ltd (in liquidation) Knapp Hicks Partners Advanced Underpinning Ltd (Pt 20 defendants) (2001) 3 TCLR 461. Therefore, this effectively means that where the sub-contractor is in breach and this has caused injury to a third party, they will be liable even if both have been held liable to the third party in tort, illustrated by Sims v. Foster-Wheeler Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 313, CA. On this basis, it must be recognised that the sub-contractor’s liability in contract may include damages and costs the contractor has had to pay to the third party, in keeping with the decision in Caister Group Developments Ltd v. Paul Rackham Construction Ltd (1973) 226 Estates Gazette 809. (b) Sub-contractors liability A construction contract is also considered to be particularly useful in such cases where, in breach of a contract, the sub-contractor then proceeds to delay completion of the overall work, having known at the date of contracting that the main contractor is liable to liquidated damages or forfeiture for delay, the liability of the sub-contractor to the contractor is increased, in keeping with the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341. Therefore, with this in mind, the main contractor will then be able to recover the damages they have had to pay out to the client owing to the delay caused by the sub-contractor, or profit they would have made, together with the cost of work, supported by Biggin Co Ltd v. Permanite Ltd [1951] 2 KB 314, CA. However, it is also to be appreciated that knowledge of the main contract is not sufficient to prove the sub-contractor agreed with the main contractor to be bound, so if the sub-contractor properly completes their work, their right to payment will not depend upon the certificate of the architect, notwithstanding it is a condition precedent to payment to the main contractor, in keeping with the decision in Southern Water Authority v. Carey [1985] 2 All ER 1077. But where the sub-contractor expressly contracts to be bound by the terms of the main contract, provisions as to retention money will be applied to them proportionally, supported by Geary, Walker Co Ltd v. Lawrence Son (1906) 2 Hudson’s BC (4th Edn) 382, CA. Nevertheless, it must also be recognised that a sub-contractor who voluntarily undertakes extra work or uses better materials than those stipulated has no claim, according to Ashwell Nesbit Ltd v. Allen Co (1912) 2 Hudson’s BC (4th Edn) 462. (a) Sale of Goods Act 1979 The remit of the Sale of Goods Act (‘SGA’) 1979 effectively applies to sale of goods contracts with its implied terms in relation to quality and fitness for purpose with regards to both business-to-consumer and business-to-business sale of goods contracts. But whilst, in view of the changes made by the SGA 1995, the standard covering issues such as freedom from minor defects and durability seems to have become quite high, this may, in fact, be something of a misnomer, according to, for example, Saphena Computing v. Allied Collection Agencies [1995] FSR 616. Moreover, there is an old legal maxim, ‘nemo dat quod non habet’, which means ‘no one can give what he does not have’, that was enshrined in the SGA 1979 long ago in 1893 so that if someone sells goods that are not there’s, or which they do not have the authority to sell, the buyer cannot acquire ‘good title’, so that the ability to pass property and the time of its passin g are very important. In looking to appreciate the significance of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (‘UCTA’) 1977, it must be recognised that, whilst, generally, the law of contract has created a range of ways for the individual terms of a contract to be avoided or ‘blunted’, the remit of UCTA 1977 is actually almost entirely focussed upon contractual provisions and notices that look to effectively limit or exclude liability, or its equivalent. As a result, whilst some of UCTA 1977’s controls apply universally and strike down particular terms unconditionally, other controls actually allow a ‘term’ to be effectively justified as ‘reasonable’, so a large business can still impose onerous terms, because there is no statutory protection provided for. This is supported by the fact courts in this country have also looked to apply principles to make contracts work, according to the principle established in G Percy Trentham Ltd v. Archital Luxfer Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at p.27 that â€Å"the transaction †¦ performed on both sides will also make it unrealistic to argue that there was no intention to enter into legal relations Specifically, the fact that the transaction is executed makes it easier to imply a term resolving any uncertainty, or alternatively, it may make it possible to treat a matter as not finalised in negotiations as inessential†. Therefore, with this in mind, each and every case that comes before the court in this country must be decided solely on the specifics of its facts and the construction of its agreement. As a result, some surprisingly draconian exclusion clauses have been upheld, supported by SAM Business Systems v. Hedley Co [2002] EWHC 2733, despite the fact English case law developed no general principle allowing terms apparently agreed by parties to a contract to be attacked solely on grounds of unfairness, illustrated by Mitsubishi Corp v. Eastwind Transport Ltd [2004] EWHC 2924. This is because, according to the Law Commission’s ‘Second Report on Exemption Clauses’ ((1975) (Law Com No. 69)), a contract term â€Å"bears its natural meaning of any term in any contract (and is not limited to terms in a contract between the instant parties)†. But it is also to be appreciated that a contract term or notice may amount to a contractual exclusion clause which is apt to exclude or restrict liability for breach of either a contractual or tortious duty of care, supported by Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Health Authority [1992] QB 333, or a disclaimer notice apt only to exclude or restrict tort liability, dependent on the nature of the contract (c) The Consumer Protection Act 1987 In keeping with this line of thought, it is also important to appreciate that the remit of the Consumer Protection Act (‘CPA’) 1987, between sections 10 and 19, supported by the decision in R v. Liverpool City Council, ex p Baby Products Association Ltd [2000] LGR 171, DC, has looked to effectively establish a system so as to be able to impose liability in relation to unsafe consumer goods and a standard of saftey that all maufacturers and retailers must look to comply with or risk committing an offence. Therefore, on this basis, the CPA 1987 has also served to establish that any breach of the safety regulations is an offence that not only provides a consumer with even greater scope to reject the goods, but also serves to give the Secretary of State the power to be able to serve prohibition notices. ‘Halsbury’s Laws of England’ Lexis Nexis, Butterworths (2007) Law Commission’s ‘Second Report on Exemption Clauses’ (1975) (Law Com No. 69) A Roberts Co Ltd v. Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555 Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 1 B Ald. 681 Alternative Publishing Ltd v. Kingstar Manufacturing (UK) Ltd [1996] CLY 1223, CA Ashwell Nesbit Ltd v. Allen Co (1912) 2 Hudson’s BC (4th Edn) 462 Aurum Investments Ltd v. Avonforce Ltd (in liquidation) Knapp Hicks Partners Advanced Underpinning Ltd (Pt 20 defendants) (2001) 3 TCLR 461 Bank of Boston Connecticut v. European Grain Shipping Ltd [1989] AC 1056, HL Barton v. Armstrong [1975] 2 All ER 465, PC Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161, HL Belle River Community Arena Inc v. WJC Kaufmann Co Ltd (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 761 Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58, HL Biggin Co Ltd v. Permanite Ltd [1951] 2 KB 314, CA Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl Stahl warenhandelgesellschaftmbh (1982) 1 All ER 293 British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Engineering Co [1984] 1 All ER 504 Brogden v. Directors of the Metropolitan Railway Company (1877) 2 App. Las 666 Butler Machine Tool Co v. Ex-Cell-O Corp [1979] 1 WLR 401 Byrne v. Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 349 Caister Group Developments Ltd v. Paul Rackham Construction Ltd (1973) 226 Estates Gazette 809 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256 Chillingworth v. Esche [1924] 1 Ch 97 Countess of Dunmore v. Alexander (1830) 9 S. 190 Currie v. Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 Davies v. Sweet [1962] 2 QB 300 Dennant v. Skinner Collom [1948] 2 KB 164 Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, HL Entores v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 ER Dyer Ltd v. Simon Build/Peter Lind Partnership (1982) 23 BLR 23 Felton v. Wharrin (1906) 2 Hudson’s BC (4th Edn) 398, CA Fisher v. Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 G Percy Trentham Ltd v. Archital Luxfer Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25 Geary, Walker Co Ltd v. Lawrence Son (1906) 2 Hudson’s BC (4th Edn) 382, CA Glasgow